Iran rejects Bush's 'World War III' warning
Putin justified his recent talks with the Iranian leadership in Tehran while Sri Lanka has voiced support for the Islamic country's right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes
Palash Biswas
Contact: Palash C Biswas, C/O Mrs Arati Roy, Gosto Kanan, Sodepur, Kolkata- 700110, India. Phone: 91-033-25659551
Email: alashbiswaskl@gmail.com">palashbiswaskl@gmail.com
Iran rejects Bush's 'World War III' warning while Russian President Vladimir Putin justified his recent talks with the Iranian leadership in Tehran as an important contribution towards a peaceful resolution of the nuclear row with Iran during a televised question-and-answer session on Thursday.Iran rejected US President George W Bush's ''World War III'' warning as ''nothing more than a psychological war'', Tehran media reported on Thursday. Meanwhile,Opposing any new sanctions against Iran, Sri Lanka has voiced support for the Islamic country's right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Ruling comradors including the so called anti imperialist Communists failed to react as they are quite detached with the latest developments in this region, torn withsponsered War and Civil War.On the other hand,After five days of shuttle diplomacy, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, has returned home empty-handed today having failed to pin down participants, an agenda or even a firm date for a planned Middle East peace conference.
Bush had on Wednesday warned that a nuclear-armed Iran could lead to a third world war because of the Islamic state's determination to destroy Israel.
''Direct dialogue leads to success faster than a policy of threats and sanctions,'' Putin said during a public event organized by state television in Moscow.
Iran was a ''very important partner'' of Russia in the energy sector, he said.
Putin also addressed secret service reports of a planned assassination attempt against him during the Tehran trip. ''That was nothing more than an attempt to halt the visit,'' he said.
Russian sources said the information about the assassination plot came from foreign secret services.Putin met the Iranian leadership in Tehran on Tuesday.
''This kind of remarks just reflects US anger over Iran's success in the international scenery and are nothing more than psychological war against Iran,'' the deputy head of the National Security Council, Rahman Fazli, told the Iranian Students' News Agency (ISNA).
Fazli said that Iran's nuclear programmes were acknowledged by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and even the five United Nations Security Council member states plus Germany have supported the agreement between Iran and the IAEA as the basis for settling the nuclear dispute.He added that the state visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Tehran was another reason for US anger, claiming that the visit has weakened US status in the Middle East.
Bush on Wednesday had said Iran poses a threat to peace and referred to comments by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has previously said Israel should be eliminated.
''We have got a leader in Iran who has announced that he wants to destroy Israel,'' Bush said. ''So I have told people that if you are interested in avoiding World War III it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.''
Bush's comments followed a visit to Tehran by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, where he met Ahmadinejad, pledged closer ties between the two countries and stated there was no evidence to support western accusations that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons.
With Tehran facing growing pressure from the US and its European allies over its controversial nuclear programmes, the Sri Lankan envoy to Iran Muhammad Zuhair backed Iran-IAEA negotiations and asserted that the UN atomic watchdog's conventions allow Iran to conduct nuclear researches.
The ambassador denounced "rumours" of a possible US attack against Iran and that Sri Lanka opposed the imposition of new sanctions against Tehran, the Asian Tribune reported.
The envoy's statement comes in the backdrop of Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse's visit to Iran next week to discuss various issues including infrastructure support for the island country. During his visit from October 24, Rajapakse is expected to solicit Iran's support for two power projects and a credit line for oil supplies in the backdrop of rising international crude oil prices.
"It is learnt that the Sri Lankan president will in exchange for Iran's support provide an assurance that Sri Lanka will not support any move in the UN to impose any sanctions or other strictures on Iran over is nuclear programme," the newspaper said.
Noting that China is one of Myanmar's largest investor, a United States human rights watchdog has urged Beijing to use its influence to help end "state repression" in Myanmar.
"Chinese officials have publicly called for 'cooperation and dialogue' between the Myanmarese generals and their critics, but said nothing when these critics were arrested, disappeared or killed," regretted Sophie Richardson, Asia advocacy director of Human Rights Watch (HRW).
Richardson called for suspension of involvement by state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec, both official Olympic partners, in proposed Myanmar-China oil and natural gas pipelines. He also wanted the state-owned firms, with business ties to Myanmar to publicly and fully disclose all payments made to the Myanmar military, directly or through the entities it controls.
"If China takes a strong stand on Myanmar now, it will be credited rather than criticized on 08-08-08," said Richardson. "Doing so isn't just right; it's also in China's self-interest."
HRW asked China to immediately place an embargo on all weapons transfers from Myanmar, suspend all military training, transport, assistance, and cooperation and support or abstain from vetoing UN Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions or other collective action to address the crisis.
HRW noted that 08/08/08 will not only be the opening date of the Beijing Olympics, but will also mark the 20th anniversary of the 1988 pro-democracy protests in Myanmar during which an estimated 3,000 people were killed.
http://www.ihr. org/news/ 040716_hollings. shtml
'Iraq was Invaded to Secure Israel,' says Senator Hollings, and 'Everybody Knows It.'
By Mark Weber
July 16, 2004
When a prominent American political figure speaks boldly about Jewish-Zionist power, that's news. So the recent remarks by South Carolina's senior Senator that Iraq was invaded "to secure Israel," and that "everybody" in Washington knows it, are indeed remarkable.
Ernest "Fritz" Hollings, a Democrat who has represented his state in the US Senate since 1966, is now serving his final term in Washington. That fact may also help explain why he's now willing to defy the pro-Israel lobby and speak candidly about its power.
It began with an essay about the Iraq war that appeared in the May 6 issue of the daily Post and Courier of Charleston.
"With Iraq no threat, why invade a sovereign country?," he wrote. "The answer: President Bush's policy to secure Israel. Led by [Paul] Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Charles Krauthammer, for years there had been a domino school of thought that the way to guarantee Israel's security is to spread democracy in the area."
Several Zionist organizations, as well as some prominent Jewish political figures, quickly chastised Hollings, and his remarks were denounced as anti-Semitic.
But he didn't back down. Instead, he rose in the Senate on May 20 to defend and explain his essay.
"I don't apologize for this column," he said. "I want them to apologize to me for talking about anti-Semitism." President Bush went to war in Iraq "to secure our friend, Israel" and "everybody knows it," Hollings declared.
Referring to the cowardly reluctance of his Congressional colleagues openly to acknowledge this reality, he said that "nobody is willing to stand up and say what is going on." With few exceptions, members of Congress uncritically support Israel and its policies due to "the pressures that we get politically," he said. The pro-Israel lobby knows "how to make you tuck tail and run." But "not the Senator from South Carolina," he added, referring to himself. To emphasize the seriousness of his remarks, Hollings said: "I have thought this out as thoroughly as I know how, and it worries me that here we are..."
Bush's motive in going to war for Israeli interests, Hollings charged, was to get Jewish support in election campaigns. "President Bush came to office imbued with one thought: reelection. I say that advisedly. I have been up here with eight Presidents. We have had support of all eight Presidents. Yes, I supported the President on this Iraq resolution, but I was misled. There weren't any weapons, or any terrorism, or al-Qaida. This is the reason we went to war. He had one thought in mind, and that was reelection.. .
"That is not a conspiracy. That is the policy. I didn't like to keep it a secret, maybe; but I can tell you now, I will challenge any one of the other 99 Senators to tell us why we are in Iraq, other than what this policy is here. It is an adopted policy, a domino theory of The [Zionist] Project For The New American Century. Everybody knows it [is] because we want to secure our friend, Israel...
"Let's realize we are in real trouble. Saudi Arabia is in trouble. Israel is in trouble. The United States is in trouble. I am going to state what I believe to be the fact. In fact, I believe it very strongly. They just are whistling by on account of the pressures that we get politically. Nobody is willing to stand up and say what is going on."
Hollings cited the role of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the most important pro-Israel lobby group in Washington, in determining US policy in the Middle East. "You can't have an Israel policy other than what AIPAC gives you around here. I have followed them mostly in the main, but I have also resisted signing certain letters from time to time, to give the poor President a chance.
"I can tell you no President takes office -- I don't care whether it is a Republican or a Democrat — that all of a sudden AIPAC will tell him exactly what the policy is, and Senators and members of Congress ought to sign letters. I read those carefully and I have joined in most of them. On some I have held back. I have my own idea and my own policy..."
The Iraq war has been "a bad mistake," said Hollings. "Getting rid of Saddam was not worth almost 800 dead GIs and over 3,500 maimed for life..." This war is "a mistake like Vietnam," he added. "We got misled with the [1964] Gulf of Tonkin [incident]. We got misled here, and we are in that quagmire...
"The entire thing is a mess. Don't give me 'support the troops, support the troops.' I have been with troops, about three years in combat, so don't tell me about troops. I have always supported the troops."
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WAR STORIES: MILITARY ANALYSIS.
Resign, Retire, Renounce WHAT SHOULD GENERALS DO IF BUSH ORDERS A
FOOLISH ATTACK ON IRAN?
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Wednesday, Oct. 17, 2007, at 7:17 PM ET
From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to U.S. Central Command, most of
America's military leaders have expressed wariness about, if not
outright opposition to, the idea of bombing Iran.
So, if President George W. Bush starts to prepare—or actually issues
the order—for an attack, what should the generals do? Disobey? Rally
resistance from within? Resign in protest? Retire quietly? Or salute
and execute the mission?
The appropriateness of military dissent is a hot topic among senior
officers these days in conferences, internal papers, and backroom
discussions, all of which set off emotional arguments and genuine
soul-searching.
"What should we have done in the run-up to the war in Iraq?" the
generals are asking. "What should I do the next time?" is the tacit
question stirring the conscience.
At play here is a tension between two fundamental principles of the
military: the duty to provide civilian decision-makers with
unvarnished military advice on issues of warfare and the obligation
to obey all lawful orders by superiors. Under the Constitution, the
president is superior to the highest-ranked general or admiral.
For the past few years, many officers have wrung their hands over the
top generals' failure to assert their views as strongly as they
should have during the planning stages of the Iraq war. Then-
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld insisted on invading with one-
third to half as many troops as the generals were recommending. They
knew that disaster loomed, yet after the first round of disagreement,
they said nothing.
In April 2006, three years after the war began, six retired generals
spoke out against the war plans and called for Rumsfeld's
resignation. Critics of the war lauded this "generals' revolt," but
many active-duty officers—especially the junior and midlevel officers
actually doing the fighting—were repelled. They asked: Where were
these generals when they were still wearing the uniform, when their
dissent might have meant something? How could they have led us into
battle while having so little confidence in the battle plan?
Yet some senior officers believe dissent has no place within the
military, especially once a decision is made. Others wouldn't go that
far, but the guidelines are murky on where to draw the line. The
Uniform Code of Military Justice is clear: All military personnel,
including officers, are obligated to obey "lawful orders." In fact,
it is a crime, punishable by court-martial, not to obey. The
qualifier—"lawful order"—is important: It pre-empts the Nazi defense
of war crimes ("I was just following orders" is no excuse if the
orders were unlawful), and it's a legitimate way out for
conscientious soldiers who do not want to take part in atrocities
like My Lai or torture sessions like Abu Ghraib.
But it's one thing for a sergeant to disobey a lieutenant in the
frenzy of battle. It's quite another for generals to declare a
president's order "unlawful." That's not an act of conscience; it's a
coup d'état. (There are some circumstances that could confuse the
most honorable officer. For instance, in the last weeks of Richard
Nixon's presidency, when Nixon was drinking heavily and teetering on
the edge of sanity, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger directed
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to check with him before executing any
military orders from the White House. Even then, it's worth noting,
the chain of command was circumvented by the civilian defense
secretary, not by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)
Outright disobedience of a presidential order, then, is an option
that no senior U.S. officer wants even to contemplate—and we should
be thankful for that. But in a widely circulated article
titled "Knowing When To Salute," published in the July 2007
newsletter of the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute,
retired Lt. Col. Leonard Wong and retired Col. Douglas Lovelace laid
out nine options short of disobedience that a senior officer might
take when political leaders resist military advice.
If the situation involves little or no threat to national security,
they write, an officer can request reassignment, decline a promotion,
or take early retirement.
If it involves a high threat to national security, there are several
ascending courses of dissent: "public information" (a euphemism for
leaking to the press?), writing a scholarly paper, testifying before
Congress, engaging in "joint effort" (plotting?)—and, finally, if all
else fails to change things, resigning.
There is a huge distinction between retiring and resigning. When
officers retire, they do so with full benefits, health care, and
continued membership in the fraternity of military officers. When
they resign, they give up all of that.
This is why no U.S. general has resigned in more than 40 years—and
the last one to do so later asked, without success, for reinstatement.
Yet Wong and Lovelace argued that mere retirement "should not be an
option when the threat to national security is high. … It may be
personally satisfying to leave the distasteful aspects of a policy
battle, but it ignores a responsibility to the nation and the
[military] profession to do what is right."
In other words, if generals want to protest an impending decision,
and if that decision affects (in the generals' view, if it gravely
harms) national security, they should fall on their swords, and
falling on swords unavoidably hurts. If it doesn't hurt, it's not
really falling on a sword. Wong likens it to civil disobedience:
Those who engage in that act do so knowing they face jail. Similarly,
if an officer decides that he cannot in good conscience carry out the
obligations of his commission, he should give up the commission and
the benefits that go with it. Ducking out quietly—giving up the
responsibilities but not the rewards—is a cop-out.
Generals who stop short of considering resignation are not
necessarily selfish. For there is another distinction to draw between
the generals' revolt over Iraq and a hypothetical revolt over, say, a
decision to attack Iran.
The retired generals who spoke out in 2006 criticized not so much the
decision to invade Iraq but rather the way that the invasion was
planned and carried out—specifically, Rumsfeld's refusal to send what
they considered enough troops.
To many officers, these generals—and many other officers who said
nothing—had the right, even the obligation, to speak their minds on
troop levels, tactics, and strategy. However, in disputes that
involve policy, many of those same officers believe they have no
business speaking out in public or even speaking out at all.
Retired Col. Don Snider, a professor at the Army War College who has
written extensively on civil-military relations, says officers can
engage in dissent only on very narrow grounds. "Officers are the
servants, not the masters," he said in a phone interview. "If they
can't accept that, they should get out." However, he emphasized, they
should get out quietly—that is, they should retire (and maybe explain
their actions a few years down the road, after the crisis has blown
over). To resign in protest would mean injecting themselves into
issues—of policy, politics, and foreign policy—that go beyond a
military officer's professional expertise and ethos.
One officer who often thinks about these issues, but who asked not to
be identified, agrees with Snider to a point—officers, he says,
shouldn't go "outside the lane" in their dissent—but adds that
there's a "fine line" between political policy and military judgment.
For instance, if a president goes to war on the basis of faulty or
jiggered intelligence findings, the decision isn't strictly "policy,"
since intelligence analysis is also among an officer's professional
tasks.
These are the sorts of fine lines that senior officers are mulling
and skirmishing over with great intensity right now. If the run-up to
Iraq were somehow replayed, it's a fair bet that one or two generals
would resign—or retire, then speak out more promptly than they did.
(Gen. Greg Newbold, who was the Joint Staff's director of operations
at the start of the Bush administration, retired shortly before the
invasion but didn't speak out for three years—a lapse that, he later
wrote, he regretted.)
If there is a run-up to an Iranian war, what would the generals do?
This is not an easy question. But here is my proposal (an easy
proposal, some would charge, correctly, since I'm not in the
military): If the top officers up and down the chain of command all
agreed that an attack on Iran would be a disaster, on whatever
grounds, they should do all they can to sway the president—and anyone
who has influence over the president—against it. They should arrange
to be called before congressional committees and to be asked awkward
questions, which would elicit their critical replies. At the final
hour, they should threaten to retire or resign en masse and, if that
didn't work, they should follow through. (Even if they quietly
retired, the fact that three or four or six or eight generals did so
at once would have some impact.)
This is a dangerous business. It shouldn't be undertaken often (and
even on this outing, it should be done only in coordination with,
perhaps at the behest of, civilian officials who agree with their
positions—say, the secretaries of defense and state). But if the
bombing led to disaster, as many of these officers now believe it
would, they must realize—and, given the experience in Iraq, they
probably do realize—that they would share the responsibility. The
question is: Will anticipation of this responsibility lead them to do
something beforehand, if only as recompense for having done too
little before the disaster of Iraq?
